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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine epistemological connections between the words 
used by psychologists, the way words influence what  methodology we use, and how meth-
ods influence our beliefs about causality and construct phenomena regarded as psychologi-
cal "facts." These processes are considered in terms of a personal and historical perspective 
gained from nearly forty years of studying the psychology of women and gender.  This pa-
per focuses the history of the distinction between "sex" and "gender" and the continued at-
tention of researchers to the question of whether sex/gender differences exist.  It argues 
that the issue continues to be researched because of  the relative absence of socio-
structural variables such as status and power from most psychological discourse and the 
current empirical focus of many feminist psychologists in the United States.  I also argue 
that lack of attention to epistemology and to the connection between politics and scholar-
ship has led to a definition of the psychology of women and/or gender that no longer at-
tends to feminist theory and to a decline in socially activist scholarship.  Women and men 
cannot be studied in isolation from other social constructions such as race/ethnicity, social 
class, sexual diversity, and cultural difference.  Such synthesis will be difficult without a 
return to concerns about epistemology and question generation that are rarely addressed 
in U. S. feminist psychology today. 
Keywords: Epistemology; Sex and Gender; Sex Differences; Feminist Psychology 
Resumen 
El propósito de este artículo es analizar las conexiones epistemológicas entre las palabras 
utilizadas por los psicólogos, la forma en que las palabras influyen en la metodología que 
usamos, y cómo los métodos influyen en nuestras creencias sobre la causalidad y los fenó-
menos entendidos como "hechos" psicológicos. Estos procesos son considerados en términos 
de una perspectiva personal e histórica obtenida a través de casi cuarenta años de estudio 
de la psicología de las mujeres y del género. Este artículo se centra en la historia de la dis-
tinción entre "sexo" y "género" y la atención continuada de los investigadores sobre la cues-
tión de si las diferencias de sexo/género existen. Afirmo que el tema sigue siendo investi-
gado debido a la relativa ausencia de variables socio-estructurales tales como el estatus o el 
poder en la mayoría del discurso psicológico y en la atención empírica actual de muchas 
psicólogas feministas en Estados Unidos. También afirmo que la falta de atención hacia la 
epistemología y hacia la conexión entre política y academia ha llevado a una definición de 
la psicología de las mujeres y/o del género que ya no atiende a la teoría feminista y a un 
declive de la academia socialmente activista. Mujeres y varones no pueden ser estudiados 
de forma aislada de otras construcciones sociales tales como raza/etnicidad, clase social, 
diversidad sexual, y diferencia cultural. Tal síntesis será difícil sin un retorno a las preocu-
paciones sobre la epistemología y sobre la generación de preguntas que apenas son aborda-
das en la psicología feminista estadounidense actual. 
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More than thirty years ago I published an arti-
cle entitled ―Toward a redefinition of sex and 
gender (Unger, 1979b).  The primary purpose 
of the article was not to change terminology 
(although this is what it became known for), 
but to challenge the study of what was then 
called ―sex differences.‖  I believed that the 
words we used influenced psychologists’ as-
sumptions about the causality of so-called dif-
ferences between females and males. I also 
believed that the word ―sex‖ was irrevocably 
connected to assumptions about biological 
causality. 
Gender was still a word largely confined to 
linguistics although a few psychologists had 
begun to use the term.  Ethel Tobach (1971), 
for example, made the point that masculine 
and feminine qualities were ascribed even to 
inanimate objects based on the gender to 
which they were linguistically assigned.  This 
point was not, however, picked up by early 
second wave feminist psychologists.   
There were three main strands of critical 
scholarship among U. S. psychologists doing 
research and formulating theory on the psy-
chology of women during the early to mid-
1970s. These were: demonstrations of sex 
discrimination in both the laboratory and the 
field; analyses of how sex-biased theory and 
method induced different behaviors in fe-
males and males; and discussions about the 
ways sex-related behavioral differences were 
validated and explained. The psychologists in-
terested in the latter issue were especially in-
terested in demonstrating that so-called sex 
differences were either unimportant or did 
not exist. Concern about the origin of differ-
ence came later. All of these issues influ-
enced my decision to introduce the term 
―gender‖ to the discipline as a whole.  In an 
attempt to add some historical perspective, I 
will discuss each of these issues in some de-
tail below. 
Experimental demonstrations of sex 
discrimination and theories about pow-
er and status 
I was trained as an experimental psychologist 
and was (and still am) interested in empirical 
demonstrations of sexism at many levels of 
society. What are the cues for such discrimi-
nation? Some of my first published studies 
(Raymond & Unger, 1972; Unger, Raymond, & 
Levine, 1974) involved a series of field exper-
iments on the triggers for discrimination in 
everyday life. We found that both white 
women and black men as compared to white 
men were discriminated against in a variety 
of everyday circumstances although we also 
found that deviant (hippie) attire trumped 
sex and race as stimuli for discrimination. 
These studies fitted well with earlier studies 
that demonstrated women’s vocational aspi-
rations were influenced by sexist language in 
job advertisements (Bem & Bem, 1970); that 
women drivers were more likely than men to 
be honked at when stopped ―too long‖ at in-
tersections (Deaux, 1971); and that women 
were less likely to be hired as faculty mem-
bers in psychology and/or given lower rank 
and salary than men with identical qualifica-
tions (Fidell, 1970). 
Most of this early research was atheoretical.  
Early theory in the psychology of women was 
largely borrowed from sociology.  Sociological 
theory offered a framework for understanding 
the underlying social dynamics for differential 
judgments of various groups. This was par-
ticularly important because, unlike other 
groups, women and men were part of the 
same relational networks.  But the integration 
of socio-structural factors was relatively late 
because many early feminist scholars had 
been trained in personality or clinical psy-
chology (c.f., Unger, 2010). Even social psy-
chology had long been separated from sociol-
ogy. It took time for U. S. psychologists to 
recognize the social and societal roots of sex-
ism. 
Sociologists were more aware of socio-
structural factors.  They early explored the 
idea that sex was a form of ascribed status--
one that a person is born with rather than 
achieves (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; 
Coser, 1966). Higher status carried with it as-
sumptions about the greater power and privi-
lege of males.  Some of these ideas trickled 
into psychology. Pioneering studies by Nancy 
Henley (1973, 1977) demonstrated, for exam-
ple, that males had the ―privilege‖ of touch-
ing women or invading their personal space 
What We Look For is What We Find  
 
Quaderns de Psicologia | 2010, Vol. 12, No 2, 35-46 
37 
without females being able to reciprocate. 
Other early studies explored interpersonal 
mechanisms that limited women’s power. 
These included discrimination against compe-
tent women (Hagen & Kahn, 1975) and differ-
ences between women and men in their 
choice of power strategies when attempting 
to influence others (Johnson, 1976).  Later 
researchers demonstrated experimentally 
that such sex-related choices were not simply 
a reflection of sex-related differential prefer-
ences. Women who violate social norms by in-
terrupting men were seen to be rude and un-
likable although no such effect was found 
with same-sex interruptions or when men in-
terrupted women (LaFrance, 1992). These 
women were upsetting established status hi-
erarchies. Sociologists have long known that 
the power to interrupt is a mark of status 
(c.f., Goffman, 1963).   
The link between status, power, and gender 
has long intrigued me. Early in my career I 
wrote several literature reviews discussing 
how the idea of sex as a status variable could 
be used to explain a great deal of psychologi-
cal research on females and males both as 
children and adults (Unger, 1976; 1978). One 
of these papers was entitled ―The politics of 
gender.‖ Its abstract indicates the large and 
diverse body of literature that I attempted to 
integrate. 
This chapter makes the case for the position that 
much of the behavioral differences between 
males and females. Is due to status and power 
differences rather than sex differences. It is sug-
gested that male gender. In itself, carries with it 
stimulus value connoting high status and power 
which is relatively independent of characteristics 
that are considered to be appropriately masculine 
or feminine. Treatment of the gender with low 
ascribed status (i.e., females) parallels the 
treatment of other low status individuals under 
all conditions examined. Three aspects of the 
psychological and sociological. Literature are re-
viewed in detail with reference to the hypothesis 
that sex differences can more parsimoniously be 
viewed as power differences: nonverbal measures 
of dominance and submissiveness; husband-wife 
power relationships; and gender differences in 
small group behavior. … 
Other points raised by this review suggest that 
performance differences do not easily eliminate 
sex-related in ascribed status due to differential 
perceptions of competent performance on the 
basis of gender. Assertion of competence and 
power by a female is likely to define her as a de-
viant and make her liable to social sanctions. 
Gender/status identity is institutionalized by our 
society.  It Is also suggested that the covert role 
of physical force and differential size and 
strength between the sexes may have been un-
derestimated as a source of behavioral differ-
ences between them…. (Unger, 1978, p. 463). 
Despite the fact that the paper was presented 
at a prestigious conference funded by U. S. 
government agencies in 1975 (see the de-
scription of the conference and its partici-
pants in Unger,1998) and was subsequently 
published in an edited book (Sherman & Den-
mark,1978), it received very little attention. 
There are probably a number of reasons for 
its lack of impact.  First, it drew heavily from 
sociological theory. Social psychology in the 
United States had long disengaged from its 
sociological roots in its quest for scientific ri-
gor in the form of laboratory experimentation 
(Danziger, 2000). Status and power could not 
easily be manipulated in the laboratory and 
certainly did not lend themselves to random 
sampling and other controls. Second, early 
work in the psychology of women focused on 
variables that could be found within ―person’s 
heads‖ rather than in relationships between 
them. Much of this work examined motiva-
tional variables such as ―fear of success‖ or 
cognitive variables such as internal and ex-
ternal attributions.  
Avoidance of socio-structural mechanisms was 
particularly evident in psychologists’ unwill-
ingness to study power. In a content analysis 
of the research literature I found, for exam-
ple, that psychologists were much more likely 
to look at social influence (which can be ma-
nipulated in the laboratory) than at how pow-
er dynamics play out in the real world (Unger, 
1986).  As I will discuss later, this individualis-
tic focus of U. S. feminist psychology contin-
ues to produce problems for distinguishing be-
tween sex and gender.  
Critique of mainstream theory and prac-
tice and the politics of gender 
Critiques of mainstream theory and practice -
pioneered by Naomi Weisstein (1968)- was 
very much part of the Zeitgeist in the 1970s 
and early 1980s.  Many of the feminist psy-
chologists doing this work were relatively 
young and low in the ―pecking order‖ of aca-
demia. Many were either graduate students or 
untenured faculty.  We did not entirely ap-
preciate the professional challenges posed by 
our attempts to fuse science and advocacy 
(Unger, 1982). Indeed, a number of early 
feminist critics did not remain in academia 
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and since many of their contributions were in 
the form of conference presentations, their 
work has largely escaped the attention of his-
torians.   
―Toward a redefinition of sex and gender‖ 
began life as a paper entitled ―The rediscov-
ery of gender‖ in a symposium I organized for 
the Eastern Psychological Association in 1977.  
The title of this symposium was ―Sex as a 
stimulus versus sex as a subject variable‖. 
This was not an entirely new idea. Florence 
Denmark and I had already used the concept 
as a play on words for the title of our text-
book ―Woman: Dependent or Independent 
Variable?‖ (Unger & Denmark, 1975). We were 
trying to make the point that sex could be 
viewed as a property of individuals or as a 
stimulus for others’ behavior. Although the 
language was positivist and not used by femi-
nists today, it was then part of a lively dia-
logue on sex bias in psychology. Many of the 
participants in this dialogue were part of a 
group of feminist psychologists located in and 
around New York City.  
Unfortunately, I did not keep all of these pa-
pers and am reluctant to cite work that is not 
accessible or may not even still exist. Some of 
these studies were discussed in the introduc-
tory chapter of my text ―Female and Male‖ 
(Unger, 1979a). And some papers were pub-
lished and are still cited today. These papers 
discussed, respectively: the need to recognize 
that sex is a major feature of  people’s per-
ceptions of others even during rapid imper-
sonal encounters (Grady, 1975/1979; 1981); 
the way researchers used different measures 
of the ―same behavior‖ (aggression) in studies 
of women and men (McKenna & Kessler, 
1977); and the nature of appropriate control 
groups for comparisons between the sexes 
(Parlee, 1981). The latter study found that 
researchers interested in health issues often 
used sisters as controls for their brothers ra-
ther than making comparisons to women in 
the same occupational roles as the male sub-
jects. These contrasts implied biological ra-
ther than social causality. 
My paper used the term ―gender‖ to explore 
questions about  what psychologists were ac-
tually studying when they looked at sex dif-
ferences and why they were doing this re-
search at all. The paper was very well re-
ceived and people urged me to publish it.  
However, there were few outlets for theoret-
ical work and fewer still for overtly political 
critique. I believe it was Carolyn Sherif (who 
was the discussant at this symposium) who 
urged me to pursue the most prestigious and 
improbable venue first.  I was quite amazed 
when I received a ―revise and resubmit‖ let-
ter from an editor of the American Psycholo-
gist (the flagship publication of the American 
Psychological Association) which stated that 
although reviewers had found a number of 
good ideas in the paper, they also found it 
―too polemical‖ and it could be considered 
for publication only if ―I toned it down‖ (see 
Unger, 1998, pp. 92 – 93 for the final three 
paragraphs that I removed—these discussed 
the role of feminism in psychology).  
Why is this story relevant? It reflects the am-
bivalent relationship that U.S. feminists had 
and continue to have with mainstream psy-
chology. We have been successful in using 
their tools to challenge some of the most sex-
ist aspects of terminology and methodology. 
We have been less successful in influencing its 
epistemological underpinnings. In particular, 
we have had little impact on U. S. psycholo-
gy’s love affair with quantitative data and the 
implications that beliefs about value-
neutrality and objectivity have on psycholo-
gists’ conceptualizations about the nature of 
human beings (Unger, 1983). 
We have yet to convince psychologists (even 
many feminist psychologists) to move from a 
dialogue about methods to a dialogue about 
epistemology.  We have yet to answer Barba-
ra Wallston’s (1981) question about what are 
the important questions for the psychology of 
women. This is what I meant when I stated 
that the question of sex differences is not a 
feminist question (Unger, 1979b). 
What, then, are our questions and how do we 
answer them? In part, we need to recognize 
that it is possible to do feminist research 
without dealing directly with sex or gender. I 
have tried to do this by examining how im-
plicit ideology influences one’s view about 
the world (Unger, Draper, & Pendergrass, 
1986; Unger, Gareis, & Locher, 2007). In this 
research we have found repeatedly that there 
are no significant sex differences in a meas-
ure of personal epistemology that ranges from 
positivist to constructionist views of how the 
world works although personal epistemology 
does influence how people view gender.  
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As I noted in 1979, sources of individual dif-
ference other than sex and race have been 
neglected by psychology. In today’s world, re-
ligious ideology is very important. It can ei-
ther interact with gender or override it in at-
titudes about social and political issues (Un-
ger, 1992; Unger, 2005). I am not the only 
feminist psychologist interested in the role of 
covert ideologies. For example, Lauren Dun-
can (2006) has studied the role of right-wing 
authoritarianism in shaping attitudes about 
family life and career choices in young as well 
as midlife women. 
Although feminists have long been aware of 
the role of sexist ideology in influencing the 
treatment of women, ideology has not, until 
recently, been of much interest to psychology 
as a whole. This is beginning to change alt-
hough the contributions of feminist psycholo-
gists in this area remain unacknowledged 
(c.f., Jost, 2006). Despite this neglect, femi-
nists need to continue to ask questions about 
what promotes biologically essentialist views 
about women and men and how such views 
are linked to support for inequality and social 
injustice (see Jost & Hunyady, 2005 for an ex-
cellent discussion of the attitudinal and be-
havioral correlates of various system justify-
ing ideologies).  
Ideology also influences when and how mes-
sages about difference are transmitted and 
how they influence our beliefs. We need more 
studies such as the recent study that docu-
mented a correlation between the politically 
conservative ideology of newspapers and the 
number of biologically essentialist stories 
about sex differences that these sources pub-
lish (Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004). More fright-
eningly, this study also found that biological 
explanations for sex differences influenced 
students’ subsequent endorsement of gender 
stereotypes and their belief that human be-
havior cannot be changed.    
This study shows how the laboratory can be 
helpful.  Important research has been done 
there on the mechanisms through which gen-
der is constructed. Although many feminists 
have discussed the idea of gender as perfor-
mance, most of the work on the mechanisms 
of social construction has been done by indi-
viduals who do not identify themselves as 
feminist psychologists. Perhaps this is because 
the stimulus aspects of sex and other cues 
such as race/ethnicity appear to involve simi-
lar social cognitive mechanisms. Feminists 
may have difficulty recognizing this connec-
tion if they focus their studies only on women 
and men.  
Since the first edition of our textbook (Unger 
& Crawford, 1992), we have always devoted 
an early chapter entitled ―Doing Gender‖ to 
empirical research on power, the stimulus as-
pects of sex, and the social construction of 
gender. Most of this work deals with status 
and power as well as sex and gender. These 
social processes include studies of gender as a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. One such study 
demonstrated, for example, that individuals 
who are labeled by the experimenter as ei-
ther ―male‖ or ―female‖ can be led to behave 
in stereotypically gendered ways, regardless 
of their actual sex. These studies, of course, 
require that the individuals involved com-
municate via computer, but subtle cues about 
ascribed sex are sufficient to change the tar-
get’s behavior without their awareness that 
their ascribed sex has been manipulated by 
the experimenter. These studies demonstrate 
that gender is ―performed‖ in reaction to the 
behaviors of the person with whom an indi-
vidual is interacting (Skrypnek & Snyder, 
1982).   
More recently, researchers have focused on 
work in the area known as ―stereotype 
threat‖. A number of well-designed studies 
have demonstrated that members of margin-
alized groups such as women or African Amer-
icans show decrements in performance when 
they are exposed to information that indi-
cates the inferiority of their group in the do-
main being tested (Steele, 1997). And, alt-
hough these processes appear to be more 
likely to affect members of marginalized 
groups with less social power, it is intriguing 
that white males also perform more poorly on 
difficult math tests when they are exposed 
beforehand to information that Asian males 
outperform white males on them (Aronson, 
Lustina, Good, Keough, Steele, & Brown, 
1999). Although power differences determine 
which groups are the usual targets of stereo-
type threat, there are no specific gender nor 
race differences in how these social psycho-
logical mechanisms influence behavior. 
The problem of sex differences 
Despite epistemological and methodological 
critiques, U. S. psychology has not yet solved 
Rhoda Unger 
 
http://quadernsdepsicologia.cat 
40 
the problem of what to do about sex differ-
ences. This has been an area of concern from 
the earliest days of second wave feminism. 
Indeed, first wave feminist psychologists also 
tackled the issue. Stephanie Shields (1975a & 
b) has provided well documented and incisive 
articles on the history of sex difference re-
search by the first wave of feminist psycholo-
gists. Despite intensive, exhaustive, and suc-
cessful studies to refute hypotheses purport-
edly demonstrating the superiority of males, 
they were not successful in changing the 
frame. Whenever their research failed to sup-
port any particular biologically determinist 
theory of sex differences, male researchers 
simply shifted to another domain.  
A similar exhaustive effort to test the validity 
of sex differences in a variety of areas during 
the early years of second wave feminism 
(Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974) also met the same 
fate. Despite their demonstration that sex 
differences were inconsistent or nonexistent 
in most psychological domains, psychology 
textbooks reported extensively only on those 
four areas where the researchers concluded 
that they had found sex differences.  
Second wave feminists have spent more than 
thirty years debunking the idea that women 
and men are different in essential ways and 
demonstrating that sex similarities are more 
important than sex differences (see Hyde, 
2005; Eagly & Diekman, 2006; and Barnett & 
Rivers, 2004 for important recent work in the 
area). However, even when the work was en-
gagingly written by a well-known social psy-
chologist/journalist with good media contacts 
(Tavris, 1992), her book entitled ―The Mis-
measure of Women‖ never achieved the best-
selling status that anecdotal accounts arguing 
that  the sexes are from different planets 
routinely receive. 
The question of sex differences is not a femi-
nist question. It is also not a question that 
can be resolved.  This is because the question 
is an epistemological rather than an empirical 
one. In 1979 I listed some of the reasons why 
those of us interested in gender should not 
concern ourselves with sex differences: 
1. The questions of sex differences are someone 
else’s questions—they do not, of themselves, il-
luminate the mechanisms that create such differ-
ences. In fact, they may obscure the origin of 
such differences by leading us to  believe that bi-
ological explanations are sufficient for under-
standing these behaviors. It is also important to 
remember that biological determinants which are 
used to distinguish between groups are some-
times chosen for other than scientific, objective 
reasons. 
2. One cannot prove the null hypothesis and any-
way, the argument can just shift to another phe-
nomenon. 
3. Examination of sex differences obscures the 
examination of sex similarities. Sex similarities 
are not as dramatic and are less likely to be pub-
lished than sex differences. The fact that the 
sexes are similar in far more ways than they are 
different is not considered startling psychological 
news. 
4. Analyses based on sex differences tend to im-
ply a trait view of psychology that obscures the 
situational determinants of behavior. Under many 
conditions the constraints of the situation tend to 
play a larger role in determining the individual’s 
behavior in that context than do the psychologi-
cal characteristics the individual brings to that 
situation. 
5. Studies of sex differences do not examine be-
haviors in which the rate is virtually zero for one 
sex.  Thus, we do not find studies of sex differ-
ences in rape. And until recently, there was no 
comparison of periodic male and female cycles. 
In a sense, therefore, studies concentrate on 
those areas in which males and females are least 
different. (Unger, 1979b, pp. 1089 - 1090). 
Despite these unresolved issues, many femi-
nist psychologists continue to do such studies. 
Both mainstream and feminist journals (the 
American Psychologist and Feminism & Psy-
chology) featured dialogues on the matter 
with an equal number of feminist psycholo-
gists weighing in on each side of the discus-
sion (c.f., Eagly, 1995; Kitzinger, 1994). 
Did the addition of the word “gender” 
change psychology? 
Of course, one can raise similar objections to 
examinations of gender differences. And 
there are reasons to believe that only the 
words have changed. David Haig (2004) docu-
mented the rise in the use of the word ―gen-
der‖ in psychological journals beginning in 
about 1980 whereas the use of the word ―sex‖ 
remained flat or declined. However, he also 
found that differentiation between the terms 
remained vague. Occasionally, one even finds 
studies of animals that indicate their gender. 
Perhaps the most ironic example of termino-
logical confusion is that of the journal ―Sex 
Roles‖ which retains its name, but mandates 
authors to use the word ―gender‖ in their ar-
ticles (Chirsler, 2007).  It is not, therefore, 
surprising that students are confused too. 
What We Look For is What We Find  
 
Quaderns de Psicologia | 2010, Vol. 12, No 2, 35-46 
41 
When asked about the sex/gender distinction 
recently, many students were perplexed and 
believed that ―sex‖ is an outdated word for 
talking about ―gender‖ (Capdevila, 2007). 
Part of the problem is that feminist psycholo-
gy has still not come to terms with the epis-
temological assumptions induced by the words 
we use. For example, we cannot agree on 
what underlies either sex or gender (see 
Deaux, 1993; Unger & Crawford, 1993). These 
arguments have become even more compli-
cated as we consider the properties of lesbi-
an, gay, bisexual, and transgendered individ-
uals (Smith, Johnson-Robledo, McHugh, & 
Chrisler, 2010). We have known about ―doing 
gender‖ for a long time (c.f., West & Zim-
merman, 1987), but have not yet become ac-
customed to the myriad ways that individuals 
can ―do sex‖. 
A brief examination of current dia-
logues 
Most of the work that is discussed in this arti-
cle derives from what is often termed ―femi-
nist empiricism‖.  This is partly because fem-
inist psychologists maintain a dialogue with a 
mainstream field that remains committed to 
scientific ―rigor‖. If feminist psychologists 
want to change the discipline we must engage 
with its language and concepts while retain-
ing a critical view of both.  
But feminist psychology is also informed by 
postmodernism with its emphasis on the so-
cial construction of reality as well as the po-
litical nature of that reality. Meredith Kimball 
has pointed out repeatedly that sex differ-
ences and similarities are not a dichotomy but 
a necessary contradiction: 
By this, I mean that there is no one single answer 
to whether sex similarities or differences are 
more true or accurate even within one area—e.g., 
interpersonal violence. Always context is im-
portant. Some constructions will generate gender 
similarities and some will generate gender differ-
ences. What is important is that we always pay 
attention to context and to see how changes in 
the context challenge our previous understand-
ings. (Kimball, 2007, pp. 456 – 457).   
These ideas challenge traditional mainstream 
ideas about universal laws of behavior. They 
also blur the distinction between the study of 
the individual and the study of the social 
world.  It is noteworthy that Kimball, unlike 
most psychologists, has chosen to focus on 
both individuals and groups during her long 
career (c.f., Kimball, 1995). 
Abigail Stewart is another feminist psycholo-
gist who has been influenced by postmodern-
ism who has also focused on both individuals 
and the social forces that influence collective 
behavior. One of her recent major contribu-
tions to the dialogue on sex and gender is to 
redefine gender as a political phenomenon ra-
ther than a property of either individuals or 
social interactions (Stewart & McDermott, 
2004). In this definition, gender is a funda-
mental part of the social structure that con-
trols individual behavior. Unfortunately, little 
attention has been paid to this kind of defini-
tion of gender in most feminist discussions of 
gender as a property of individuals. 
But postmodernism also produces problems 
and unresolved questions. Language and met-
aphor do not fully explain human realities and 
may lead us further and further away from 
lived experience. Lived experience involves 
not only the individual’s interpretation of re-
ality but also reality’s response to him or her 
(as manifested in others’ behaviors). 
Gender-differentiating behaviors have real 
world consequences that cannot be ignored. 
Scholarship uses words, but it is not just 
about words. Problems such as violence, ine-
quality, and social injustice do not go away 
because we understand their socially con-
structed nature. Feminist questions must be 
examined in terms of what impact they have 
on reality even as we argue about whether or 
not there is such a thing as reality. 
Scholarship and social change 
 Some activist scholars who seek meaningful 
social change are not part of dialogues about 
epistemology and the nature of reality. They 
have worked on problems involving the edu-
cation of incarcerated women (Torre & Fine, 
2005); the sexual implications of torture 
(Zurbriggen, 2005); and the impact of ine-
qualities based on social class (Lott & Bullock, 
2007). Other feminist psychologists who have 
contributed a great deal to theory have 
moved to more applied work. These include 
work on violence against women (Barata & 
Senn, 2003) and on how to bring more women 
into science and engineering (Settles, 
Cortina, Malley, & Stewart, 2006). It is a dis-
tressing limitation of feminist psychology in 
the United States that it does not usually 
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acknowledge applied research. This work is 
not often cited by textbooks on the psycholo-
gy of women as an integral part of the field.    
It is important to understand the politics of 
psychology as well as the politics of gender. 
The issue of how to generate hypotheses in 
order to ask meaningful questions has not 
been solved. Feminist critique has shifted fo-
cus over time from the language we use to 
define our concepts; to the methods we use 
to create them; and to the covert ideologies 
that lead us to believe that some ways of 
looking at reality are more true than others. 
But an examination of even feminist journals 
shows very little methodological change alt-
hough the populations studied have become 
more diverse and some studies have become 
more applied. Many researchers continue to 
use methods that are easy to operationalize 
and do not question how and why they are us-
ing particular methods. This is not a new 
problem. Martha Mednick (1989) has written 
eloquently about a ―bandwagon effect‖ and 
the tendency to reproduce research that use 
only the most popular constructs without 
questioning them.   
Part of the problem is how easily we forget 
our history. This neglect is facilitated by short 
introductions to journal articles that focus on-
ly upon the most relevant and recent re-
search. This leads to a lot of measures that 
seem little different from earlier ones and 
appear to be ―clean-ups‖ rather than concep-
tual breakthroughs. But another part of the 
problem is that the field appears to have lost 
the passion that led many of us into it.  One 
finds few papers with the passion (and humor) 
found in the work of some of its pioneers 
(c.f., Sherif, 1979). Is this what happens when 
we separate our scholarship from advocacy 
for social change? 
Conclusions 
If someone asked me today, I would probably 
define both sex and gender as social con-
structs and argue that any biological under-
pinnings are irrelevant to those who are in-
terested in psychological reality. Biology may 
influence how individuals see themselves, 
who they attracted to as sexual partners, and 
how they behave under some conditions, but 
it is the responses of others that maintain a 
sex/gender system. 
What we know today is that human beings are 
very complicated and that simple dichotomies 
of male and female do not work. Neither do 
simple dichotomies between sex and gender.  
Like many other so-called dichotomies, the 
debate between working within and working 
from outside the mainstream also seems to be 
a false dichotomy. We need to recognize the 
limits of doing either one alone. Working in-
side can lead to cooption and working outside 
can lead to marginalization (Michelle Fine, 
personal communication, May 21, 2007).  
We have a rich past and present, but what is 
the future of feminist psychology?  U. S. fem-
inist psychologist cannot be complacent. 
Fewer and fewer young women are willing to 
identify with the term ―feminist‖ although 
they agree with many of its positions (Zucker, 
2004). Many believe all of the problems of 
gender inequality have been solved and/or 
cling to individual rather than social and cul-
tural explanations for social injustice. Where 
is the new cohort of feminist scholars to come 
from?   
There are now many more women psycholo-
gists than when I received my Ph.D. in 1966. 
If one looks at the expansion of journals on 
the psychology of women, there are also more 
people doing research in this area. I am not 
sure how many of these younger researchers 
would characterize themselves as feminists 
nor do I know what they would mean if they 
did so. The cohort of feminists in academia is 
aging and when well-known feminists leave 
their positions, these are not always filled by 
another feminist. Who will mentor and train 
the next cohort? 
Many academic institutions have shifted the 
titles of their programs from women’s to gen-
der studies. While some argue that the psy-
chology of gender is more inclusive, it is also 
less overtly political (LaFrance, Paluck, & 
Bescoll, 2004). Textbooks in this area are also 
more likely to look at sex differences than 
texts in the psychology of women (Unger, 
2004). Although we know the power of words, 
few of the textbooks in this area include 
much discussion about feminism. 
Few current textbooks in the psychology of 
women and gender deal with the conceptual 
distinction between sex and gender or discuss 
it only to deny that the distinction is mean-
ingful today.  I agree it probably is not. Per-
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haps we could/should have predicted the cur-
rent conflation of sex and gender from the 
absence of feminist theory from much of pre-
sent discourse. 
Rather than end on a pessimistic note, there 
are some promising developments.  Some 
theorists have become concerned about dif-
ferences among women rather than differ-
ences between women and men.  The con-
cept of ―intersectionality‖ is particularly 
promising because it incorporates the per-
spectives of black as well as white feminist 
psychologists (c.f., Cole, 2009; Shields, 2008). 
It posits that individual identity is fluid and 
shifts depending on whether gender, race, or 
class is more salient at any given time. This 
theory brings the social system inside the in-
dividual and is certainly less reductionist than 
most psychological theories. This theory also 
brings in cultural factors and may reduce the 
hegemonic influence of scholarship based 
primarily on professional literature from the 
English-speaking world. 
Qualitative, narrative, and various forms of 
action research are more popular outside of 
the United States than within it. There have, 
however, been few attempts to reconcile the-
se perspectives with beliefs about the objec-
tivity of quantitative methods and the validity 
of laboratory experiments. When feminist 
scholars ignore mainstream demands they ex-
pose themselves to multiple charges of devi-
ance. In addition to the still problematic 
practice of focusing on women (which may be 
one of the reasons that the study of gender 
differences is still so popular today), they are 
open to charges of violating scientific norms 
of value neutrality as well as concerns about 
the objectivity of their methods. Michelle Fi-
ne (2006) addressed the latter issue in an out-
line for a fictional methods text. She exam-
ined questions of objectivity and subjectivity, 
history and psychology, relations among units 
of analysis, expert and construct validity, and 
the ever-thorny issue of generalizability. It is 
noteworthy that Fine drew her inspiration 
from black and liberation psychologists as 
well as from feminists. It is also noteworthy 
that this essay was not published in a feminist 
journal.  
Feminist theory needs to be practiced. It 
needs to be scrutinized. The basic feminist 
question is: For whom are we doing this work 
and why?  At its best, it can change the world 
as well as inform our scholarly communities. 
If we are lucky, it may ignite our passions.  
But it is clear that we need to generate the 
―right questions‖ because if we ask the wrong 
ones, those who wish to maintain the status 
quo will not have to worry about our answers. 
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